©picture alliance / TheKremlinMoscow-SvenSimon | The Kremlin Moscow
In Moscow, the hawkish faction is gaining strength: figures from the security services who want to accelerate the offensive in Ukraine. Within that group, the FSB—the successor to the KGB, from which Vladimir Putin also hails—is assuming an increasingly influential position. The agency is expanding its grip on military and political decision-making, from internet restrictions and propaganda in schools to criminal prosecutions.
The “siloviki”— the collective term for top officials in security and justice—promised Putin a swift victory on February 24, 2022. More than four years later, they are pushing for a new escalation. For example, in late May, the hypersonic Oreshnik missile was deployed in attacks on Kyiv, a sign that Russia can strike targets 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers away. The missile is nuclear-capable, but it is believed that it was not launched with nuclear warheads during those weekend attacks.
500,000 new recruits?
At the same time, discussion is growing about a new mobilization. Senior official Dmitry Medvedev called reports on the matter “rumors and paid propaganda,” but independent media and analysts point to preparations for the fall, possibly after the Duma elections in September. Russians are searching en masse for information on visa-free travel options and the fastest ways to obtain a passport; in July, Moscow residents even reported that it was nearly impossible to schedule passport appointments.
Nearly half a million Russian soldiers killed and 1.4 million wounded
Recruitment figures reflect growing strain. In the first quarter, 800 to 1,000 people signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense each day. That represents a 20 percent decline compared to last year. The Russian army is making slow gains on the ground and suffering enormous losses; estimates range up to 450,000 dead and 1.4 million wounded. The pool of volunteers willing to enter the “meat grinder” front lines for high contract pay is running dry.
What will Putin decide now?
Analysts therefore expect the Kremlin to opt for a gradual, partially hybrid mobilization. This could include elements of a limited state of emergency: a ban on protests, even stricter censorship, possible property confiscation, and new rules for exit visas. There is also speculation about a (partial) VPN ban and new repressive and economic measures, such as higher fuel prices. Experts doubt whether mobilization will benefit the front lines. “It’s not easy to turn large numbers of people into progress,” says military analyst Gustav Gressel in EU Observer. Historian Sergei Lukashevsky calls mobilization a strategic tipping point for Putin: the war is at a stalemate, and Russia’s greatest advantage—a secure rear—is under pressure from Ukrainian drone attacks reaching deep into Siberia.
“Two Options for Putin”
According to Lukasjevski, Putin would therefore have two options: the prospect of negotiations, or a full mobilization of the country. But even that would not solve the core problems: the technological race between drones and defenses, the pace of innovation, and oil prices. “Mobilization won’t help Russia win the war,” Lukashevski told EU Observer. “But for Putin, it’s all about retaining power—and that makes his balancing act between rational calculation and irrational ambition unpredictable.”
©picture alliance / TheKremlinMoscow-SvenSimon | The Kremlin Moscow